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Lawrence J. Hatab 
BEGINNING WITH Being and Time, Heidegger was engaged in thinking the 
word truth (Wahrheit) in terms of the notion of un concealment (aletheia).1 
Such thinking stemmed from a two-fold interpretation: (1) an etymological analy-
sis of the Greek word for truth, stressing the alpha-privative; (2) a phenomenolog-
ical analysis of the priority of disclosure, which is implicit but unspoken in 
ordinary conceptions of truth. In regard to the correspondence theory, for 
example, before a statement can be matched with a state of affairs, "something" 
must first show itself (the presence of a phenomenon, the meaning of Being in 
general) in a process of emergence out of concealment. This is a deeper sense of 
truth that Heidegger came to call the "truth of Being." The notion of emergence 
expressed as a double-negative (un-concealment) mirrors Heidegger's depiction 
of the negativity of Being (the Being-Nothing correlation) and his critique of 
metaphysical foundationalism, which was grounded in various positive states of 
being. The "destruction" of metaphysics was meant to show how this negative 
dimension was covered up in the tradition, but also how it could be drawn out by 
a new reading of the history of metaphysics. In regard to truth, its metaphysical 
manifestations (representation, correspondence, correctness, certainty) missed 
the negative background of mystery implied in any and all disclosure, un-
concealment. 
At the end of his thinking, Heidegger turned to address this mystery as such, 
independent of metaphysics or advents of Being (un-concealment), to think that 
which withdraws in the disclosure of the Being of beings (e.g., the Difference, 
Ereignis, lethe). Now metaphysics is "left to itself."2 At the same time, the terms 
"Being" and "truth" are now left to metaphysics. Consequently, the word truth 
(Wahrheit) is no longer thought in terms of unconcealment (aletheia). Aletheia is 
now thought on its own as a unique word, in terms of the essential hiddenness 
(lethe) concealed in all disclosure, and the hiding of aletheia itself in the history 
IThe significant references are: Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1962), section 44; The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, tr. Albert 
Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1982), sections 17-18; "On the Essence of Truth" in 
Basic Writings, ed. David F. Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977); "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" in 
Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, vol. 3, edd. William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1962). 
'''Time and Being" in On Time and Being, tr. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 
p.24. 
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of metaphysics. The association with the word truth is thus put aside. There were 
two basic reasons for the dissociation: (1) Heidegger's desire to focus on what 
withdraws and not on what emerges, and to show that aletheia itself cannot be 
identified with any particular emergence or historical epoch; (2) the criticisms of 
his etymological claims about aletheia as a primal alpha-privative sense of truth 
prior to truth as correctness (orthotes). 
To raise the question of aletheia, of unconcealment as such, is not the same as raising 
the question of truth. For this reason it was inadequate and misleading to call aletheia 
in the sense of opening, truth . 
. . . we must acknowledge the fact that aletheia, unconcealment in the sense of the 
opening of presence, was originally experienced only as orthotes, as the correctness of 
representations and statements. But then the assertion about the essential transforma-
tion of truth, that is, from unconcealment to correctness, is also untenable.' 
I see this direction in Heidegger's thought as an unfortunate one in some 
respects. It may indeed be appropriate for certain of his purposes: It can sharpen 
non-metaphysical thinking; it helps overcome quasi-metaphysical interpretations 
of aletheia as an "original" truth from which other forms of truth are "derived"; 
the word "truth" is fitting for disclosure, i.e., what emerges out of concealment, 
and not for what withdraws or is concealed within this emergence.4 Nevertheless, 
Heidegger's direction here gives the impression of a "segregation" of aletheia 
itself on the one hand, and metaphysical thinking and truth on the other hand. 
Heidegger now seems to keep these two areas apart in some way. 
I have two reasons for regretting this atmosphere of segregation: (1) The 
historical/etymological issue regarding the connection between truth and the 
alpha-privative sense of aletheia was surrendered too easily by Heidegger. De-
spite the fact that this matter may be difficult to defend decisively from a scholarly 
standpoint, Heidegger's position is not entirely without merit, either from an 
historical standpoint (Friedlander, for example, modified his criticism), or espe-
cially from a hermeneutical standpoint. This matter should not be considered a 
dead issue.5 (2) The historical point could then continue to reinforce the phenom-
enological interpretation of truth as disclosure, unconcealment. This connection 
between the word truth and unconcealment is enormously important in my view. 
Why? First of all, the apparent separation in Heidegger's later thinking creates 
the impression that in focusing on some prior lethe as such, he is proposing some 
singular "goal" ofthinking, or some "resting place" or "source" too reminiscent. 
of metaphysical thinking.6 I am not convinced that he is, but such a charge would 
not be entirely unfair to the texts and could turn out to be warranted. But 
secondly, and more importantly, the apparent segregation drifts from what for 
me had always been the great power and promise of Heidegger's thinking, both in 
'''The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," ibid., p. 70. 
'For an insightful discussion of these matters, see John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics (Bloo-
mington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1987), pp. 176-86. 
5For a helpful summary of the scholarly issues regarding aletheia, see Robert Bernasconi, The 
Question of Language in Heidegger's History of Being (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 
1985), pp. 15-27. 
"This of course enters the territory of Derrida's critique of Heidegger. For an overview, with the 
significant references, see Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pp. 153-71. 
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the early and later writings, namely, the insights it stirs for all our thinking about 
the world. 
Heidegger should not have "given up" on the word truth (Wahrheit). The 
relationship between truth and unconcealment is an important matter, and I want 
to think the word truth in terms of this relationship. I say this not just because 
truth can mean unconcealment, but because unconcealment can mean more than 
unconcealment, it can mean truth. More: in some way it should mean truth. Along 
these lines, there are two reasons why the word truth should not be segregated 
from unconcealment, i.e., should not be reserved solely for the realm of beings 
(correctness, correspondence, etc.): (1) Thinking truth (in the realm of beings) as 
unconcealment shows that the disclosure of beings is not some "stable" realm 
simply with a hidden "origin." Metaphysics "left to itself" gives the impression 
that metaphysics simply is what it is, somehow distinct from the "negativity" of 
a mysterious origin. Truth-as-unconcealment gathers the fact that all forms of 
thinking, including the so-called hard sciences, show in their activity elements of 
unconcealment (mystery, groundlessness, negativity). Moreover, the process-
character of unconcealment speaks to and fosters the dynamic, open elements in 
all thinking, which, despite metaphysical pretenses, has never been fixed or 
certain or closed (either diachronically or synchronically). Finally, the non-
foundational character of unconcealment speaks against reductionistic judgments 
of one form of thinking by another (e.g., scientism). This permits a pluralistic 
model of disclosure that protects the "autonomy" of various forms of disclosure. 
(2) Thinking unconcealment as truth approaches the notion that unconcealment 
is more than hiddenness, mystery, negativity; it is disclosure. But more: it is not 
sheer groundless or unstable or arbitrary disclosure. Unconcealment can and 
should be integrated with the positive, "authoritative" sense of the word truth-
not in the same way the word was taken in the tradition, but in some way. I will 
develop this point shortly. 
Rejoining truth and unconcealment is important because it permits an applica-
tion of Heidegger's insights to the full range of thinking about the world; it 
interconnects those insights with a very important word, truth. There is a two-
fold mutual effect here. Truth-as-unconcealment "loosens" all forms of thinking 
from the constraints of traditional assumptions about truth. Unconcealment-as-
truth "tightens" unconcealment and mystery in the midst of world-disclosure and 
connects Heidegger's thinking with the authoritative way in which the word truth 
works (something Heidegger's early writings did not in fact ignore). 
If Heidegger's meditation on aletheia as such is said to be thinking the Opening, 
the unconcealment of Being itself out of a primal concealment, apart from the 
thinking of beings, then the following problem arises. For Heidegger, Being and 
beings can never be separated from each other, despite some confusion on this 
point in his writings.7 But this should mean that Being and beings at every level 
must always be thought together. And if, as Heidegger claims, Being and truth 
belong together, then the same relational thinking ought to apply to truth as well. 
Unconcealment and ordinary truth should also not be separated. This would have 
to go further than simply saying unconcealment allows the "unfolding" of 
'See Joseph Kockelmans, On the Truth of Being (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 56-
57 and 82. 
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ordinary models of truth. There should be a thinking "in between" unconceal-
ment and ordinary truth, the two thought together in some way-i.e., not just 
unconcealment and not just ordinary truth, and not just the two "along side" 
each other, but rather the "aletheic" feature of all thinking which at the same 
time is not without an authoritative sense of the word truth. 
In my view, the notion of unconcealment shown in the Greek word aletheia is 
the most important term in Heidegger's thought, because it effectively gathers 
and expresses what he was searching for from the beginning: the Being of beings 
which is not reducible to any state of beings. But un-concealment, in its positive-
and-negative character, should be seen as an indivisible word, a continual posi-
tive-negative interplay and tension. Its negative aspect shows the elements of 
mystery, non-foundationalism, pluralism and process. Its positive aspect shows 
more than mystery or unconcealment alone, it shows what is disclosed and how 
it is disclosed. Here we have "process" and "product" indivisibly together. 
Moreover, the historical point that the word aletheia came to mean or was taken 
to mean truth in the sense of correctness suggests that the process of unconceal-
ment should also be thought, in some way, in connection with the authoritative, 
decisive atmosphere of the word truth. So I want to explore the possibility of 
thinking truth-as-unconcealment -and-un concealment -as-truth. 8 
II 
Taking a lead from Heidegger's contention that disclosure happens in language, 
the "house of Being," we can take up this question in terms of the ways in which 
the word truth can and does work, what it can and does show. Since language 
should be no more fixed and determinate than Being, we should not assume that 
the meaning of the word truth is fixed, in terms of either the traditional assumption 
that truth as correctness is the bottom line, or the reactive assumption that since 
the word works only in the traditional way, then a post-metaphysical thinking will 
have to pass beyond the word truth to accomplish its task. Either alternative 
amounts to assuming that the word is boxed in. To conclude that truth and 
unconcealment can not work together is to presume that their meaning is fixed in 
some way. 
First, can the word truth show a meaning of unconcealment? The historical 
connection with aletheia, of course, speaks of this. But aletheia is a Greek word. 
Can the German word Wahrheit or the English word truth show something 
comparable? Etymologically, there are some ways in which they can: for exam-
ple, the connection between wahr and wesen (in the sense of unfolding), and the 
English suffix -th, which relates to the movement or coming to pass of something, 
which could suggest "truthing," a sense of process also indicated in the phrase 
"to true up. "9 Our language shows something interesting in the phrase "the 
moment of truth," which does not connote correspondence or correctness or 
even any vague conception of a ground for knowledge, but rather a situation in 
which there is an uncertain anticipation of an important occurrence. So the word 
"Regarding both parts of this complex, I do not see myself going against Heidegger in any strict 
sense. A good deal can be found in his early and later writings which can help me articulate this issue. 
91 am indebted to Kenneth Maly for these and other relevant points, from an unpublished paper, 
"On the Way to Aletheia and Its 'Truth.' .. 
ALETHEIA 435 
truth may show a connection with unconcealment in terms of the process of 
disclosure and thereby reflect a nonfoundational emergence prior to correctness. 
And given the implicit pluralism of un concealment, the word truth can accordingly 
work in areas that have to do with coming-forth rather than with correctness, one 
example being art. \0 
But the second question I have is this: Is unconcealment enough? Can we, 
should we not think unconcealment as truth as well? Once truth is related to 
unconcealment, we should perform the return gesture and relate unconcealment 
to the authoritative sense of the word truth. Once again, the historical movement 
of aletheia to the notion of correctness shows this. But that movement must be 
modified in terms of the "loosening" effect of truth-as-unconcealment. Neverthe-
less truth is needed so that unconcealment is not "let loose," as random, chaotic, 
arbitrary emergence. The English word truth can display a number of lived 
meanings that fit this purpose, and without any theoretical sense of strict correct-
ness or certainty: for example, steady and faithful staying, what properly belongs 
to something, to fit properly, loyalty, a mutual pledge. ll To speak of unconceal-
ment-as-truth is to suggest some kind of authority and the possibility of judgments 
in various forms of disclosure. 
My aim is to think truth as a process of disclosing various settings which open 
up regions of beings. This shows itself to be a three-dimensional complex: (1) 
unconcealment; (2) settings-where the word is meant in the sense of a back-
ground, an environment, like a scene setting in the theater-i.e., various "para-
digmatic" assumptions or orientations or models or narratives that set the stage 
for thinking (e.g., different settings in science, art, morality, politics, religion); 
(3) beings, i.e., the ways in which the world is shown in the light of various 
settings. The three dimensions should be seen as inseparable, indivisible, and 
inter-related. Accordingly, with truth-as-unconcealment, all three dimensions 
have an aletheic character. The settings and unfolding of beings are pervaded by 
elements of mystery, negativity, process, tension and plurality. The settings are 
not fixed, grounded, isolated or stable within themselves. Truth in some positive 
sense, however, can still happen and work. Unconcealment-as-truth can show the 
appropriateness of the settings and the ways in which the world is shown; it can 
speak to the "authority" of these showings and the ways in which they "claim" 
us, which makes our commitment to them more than arbitrary. So truth is not 
fixed or certain, it is ungrounded, a dynamic process, a tension (truth-as-
unconcealment), but not on that account without some authority (unconcealment-
as-truth). The word truth can work "in between" unconcealment and traditional 
conceptions of truth. The word and its uses can show the meanings, functions 
and relations that permit this and that are important for our thinking about the 
world. 
Let me illustrate some applications for this bi-directional approach. To begin 
with, consider typical problems in philosophy and science regarding primary 
IOHeidegger, of course, pursued this matter, especially in "The Origin of the Work of Art," found 
in Basic Writings. For a helpful treatment of the basic issues involved, see Charles Guignon, "Truth 
as Disclosure: Art, Language, History," in The Southern Journal of Philosophy 28, Supplement 
(1989), 105-20. 
"Maly, "On the Way to Aletheia and Its 'Truth.' " See under "true" and "truth" in the Oxford 
English Dictionary. 
436 HATAB 
assumptions. How can the correspondence theory of truth itself be said to be 
true? To what does it correspond? The model of empirical verification in science 
cannot itself be empirically verified. What is its justification? How can any 
principle of justification itself be justified? The problem of circularity or the 
underivability of primary principles can be attacked as a vicious circle and hence 
a frustration for thought. But truth-as-unconcealment allows us to talk of the 
truth of primary assumptions in a special way, as simply disclosed, as simply 
"given." Unconcealment expresses the givenness at certain levels ofthought, but 
insists on naming the negativity here as well (i.e., "given" means arising from 
"nothing" else; so a "given" will not mean something like "immediately certain" 
or "beyond question"). With an aletheic sense of givenness, underivability can 
then be a "virtuous" circle. 
In general terms, we should not segregate the implications of unconcealment 
from science. We should focus on elements of these implications that are at work 
in science, e.g., its process-character, its appropriate sense oflimits, its historical 
nature, its dimensions of mystery and groundlessness, the ways in which creativ-
ity, imagination and intuition operate in science, the "unsettled" character of 
science, especially in terms of revolutionary upheavals. 12 But this should not go 
only in one direction. Relating unconcealment to science should also call for 
thinking unconcealment in relation to the positive atmosphere of truth in science. 
Truth-as-unconcealment is not enough. We need some kind of link with those 
authoritative features of the ordinary sense of truth. Though always working in 
the non-foundational process of unconcealment, though never fixed, the disclo-
sure of settings and their features can give us the right to talk about truth, and 
hence the viability of judgments in some way. Why is this necessary? Because 
the lived world, the analysis of which generated Heidegger's insights regarding 
the negativity of Being in the first place, also shows and requires some sense of 
the positive, decisive tone ringing in the word truth. This is not just an arbitrary 
linguistic preference. We need to retain the word truth without limiting it to 
correctness and without slipping back into metaphysical models. In the light of 
unconcealment and its "destructive" implications, we still need to be able to say 
that scientific, moral, and political assumptions, for example, are true in some 
sense, in order to give an effective response to various radical versions of 
skepticism, relativism, phenomenalism, conventionalism, humanism, anarchism, 
or nihilism. To do this, we must link unconcealment in some fashion with the way 
the word truth has worked in the tradition and does work in ordinary, familiar 
ways. 
If we consider truth in terms of its "alterity," its contrast-relation to an 
"other," we can get a better sense of its meaning and mark the transition to the 
next section of this essay. In an "ontological" sense (unconcealment), truth's 
12Much can be gained from a dialogue between phenomenological hermeneutics and philosophers of 
science like Kuhn who are trying to loosen fixed assumptions about the nature of science. For 
example, see Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivity and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, Praxis 
(Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Theodore Kisiel, "Heidegger and the New Images 
of Science," Research in Phenomenology 7 (1977), 162-81, and "Scientific Discovery: Logical, 
Psychological or Hermeneutical," Explorations in Phenomenology, edd. David Carr and Edward 
Casey (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 263-84; Joseph Rouse, "Kuhn, Heidegger and Scientific 
Realism," Man and World 14 (1981),269-90. 
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other is concealment. In an "ontic" sense, truth's other is not only that which is 
false, but also arbitrariness, and mere opinion. Truth in the settings would be 
shown in their appropriateness to phenomena, i.e., the sense that they are not 
mere fabrications, inventions, or conventions. This does not eliminate process, 
negativity, mystery, limits, or reintroduce foundations, or fix settings, or segre-
gate them. Nor does it ignore the insights of deconstruction regarding negative 
relations and warnings about closure. I take truth to be dynamic, i.e., "moments 
of truth" that emerge, change, struggle within settings and between settings, that 
shift between settings and overlap settings-because this is what always has 
happened and does happen in our thinking about the world. But at the same time, 
in our lives, in the lived world, "taking hold" of something in some way is also 
shown, is also essential, and must involve something more than mystery, ground-
lessness, free play, or the undecidability of signs. We need a sense of truth, which 
I do not take to be a master name, but rather a working word. 
III 
Every truth involves unconcealment. But not everything "disclosed" involves 
a truth. This is not to say that truth is something primary or prior to unconceal-
ment (as in traditional metaphysics). The negativity of concealment and the 
process-character of unconcealment are "primary" in the sense of never being 
resolved or closed off. But in our lived engagement with the world, a priority 
given to truth in some sense is essential. For example, saying that art is a form of 
truth, in the sense of being unconcealed, should say something more than simply 
"something is disclosed." What is disclosed will mean something, something 
appropriate, important, sharable. I3 Also, radical skepticism can be said to involve 
unconcealment, i.e., it emerges in thought, it proposes to disclose something 
significant. But is it suited to various practical confidences that work in our lives? 
Metaphysical frameworks have emerged out of concealment. But since they have 
missed the "priority" of unconcealment, cannot their assertions of closure be 
called "untrue" in a sense? Are there not instances of thinking that "emerge," 
that we nevertheless challenge or judge in some way? 
In the tradition, truth had been the vehicle for judgment. I do not aim to restore 
metaphysical conceptions of truth or the primacy of correctness. I want to 
propose a sense of truth that is both expressive of the negativity of unconcealment 
and responsive to the need for judgments. Accordingly, I will suggest a special 
set of "conditions" for truth. But to avoid setting the wrong tone, and in keeping 
with Heidegger's image of thinking as a "way," I will suggest a set of "signs" for 
truth-in the sense of road signs-i.e., ways in which the language of truth can 
work in a dynamic, pluralistic process of disclosure, and without metaphysical 
guarantees. 
I must establish two points at the outset. First, I am focusing primarily on how 
these signs can work for the settings which open up various regions of the world. 
Moreover, these signs can work in any setting (e.g., in both art and science). 
Different forms of truth would simply be shown in the extent to which and the 
way in which the signs work in the different settings. Second, nothing in what 
"This would engage the question of significant art vs. any creation. Cf. Heidegger's analysis of Van 
Gogh's painting and a Greek temple in "The Origin of the Work of Art." 
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follows is meant to reflect a closed structure or even an aggregate of different, 
closed structures. The notion of un concealment forces our thinking to accommo-
date not only an element of mystery, but also limits, finitude, openness, and 
especially tension. The "ontological" tension between concealment and uncon-
cealment is reflected in an "ontic" tension-both between settings and within 
settings (diachronically and synchronically). In other words, there is always an 
"alteric" element in truth, a tension with an other (e.g., scientific findings are not 
emotional descriptions, religious belief is not a description of ordinary events), or 
with an opposite (sense is not nonsense), or with radical challenges in times of 
upheaval. The movement of thought does not begin or end in sheer concealment. 
The movement of emergence and concealment is at the same time a continual 
relation to an "other." This alteric element is essential not only for understanding 
the meaning of a truth, but also for appreciating the way in which a truth unfolds 
or comes to pass or changes. Truth is not the elimination of alterity; it is an 
occurrence in an ongoing tension. 14 An other will persist and at times dominate 
and bring about dislocation. This accounts for the limits, failures, and tragic 
element in life, but it also accounts for openness, movement, and innovations. 
The signs of truth simply show that in the midst of unconcealment and alterity, 
truth still happens and works; there are moments of truth. But accordingly, any 
of the "positive" signs I propose must always be balanced by conditional 
postscripts: at some time, to some extent, in some way. 
The signs for truth are in two groupings, one positive (disclosure), one negative 
(the limits of disclosure). The two groupings are mutually related, they modify 
each other, and the whole is meant to be an indivisible complex. (Also, at 
appropriate points I will suggest certain terms from Heidegger's writings that can 
reflect the meaning I intend.) So, regarding what we can say "truthfully" about 
the world, there are: 
1) Inhabitive signs, which show ways in which the world is a "dwelling," in 
line with Heidegger's sense of Wohnen, that is to say, ways in which we are 
situated and find our place in the world: 
a) appropriateness. Truth is an event of appropriation (cf. Ereignis) , where 
what we say is "fitting" for phenomena, where there is a sense of appropriate 
showing, where the world responds back to our saying. This has nothing to do 
with objectivism. 
b) reliability. Truth is "steady," in the sense of having a kind of continuity, 
rather than being utterly unstable or instantaneous or "only once"; we can "go 
on" with it. This has nothing to do with "eternal truth," or strict certainty, or 
constant universals. 
c) workability. Truth is effective; it permits us to engage the world, and the 
world likewise permits that engagement (cf. Zuhandensein and Zeugganzheit 
in Being and Time). Truth has a pragmatic element, which is not to say, 
however, that truth is only pragmatic. 
d) agreement. Truth is sharable, communicable (cf. Mitsein, Mitwelt, and 
Mitteilung in Being and Time). Agreement is a sign that something is displayed 
to us, and is not simply a particular, subjective belief. This is not to say that 
''Cf. Heidegger's use of rift and strife (Riss, Streit) in "The Origin of the Work of Art." 
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agreement is sufficient (the three signs above show that agreement is not simply 
a "convention"), or that something like complete agreement (the myth of pure 
objectivity) is even a viable thought. But, for example, we can agree about the 
limits of agreement. 
e) sense. Truth gathers the world (cf. Heidegger's interpretation of logos as 
gathering) into a shape that gives a kind of coherence to particulars. This has 
nothing to do with rigid, systematic coherence or an inviolable order. But, for 
example, acknowledging and understanding the limits of sense can be said to 
"make sense" out of elements of non-sense in existence. 
f) existential meaning. Truth expresses and reflects the lived world, the signifi-
cance of lived engagement, the concerns that animate our comportment toward 
the world (cf. being-in-the-world and the structure of care in Being and Time). 
These inhabitive signs express truth in the sense of showing a kind of "transcen-
dence"; in other words, what is said is not arbitrary, not mere opinion, and not 
merely subjective (either in the individual sense or in the collective sense of being 
merely a human projection or construction). Truth involves the ways in which the 
world is shown and shows itself. 
2) Aletheic signs, which in the atmosphere of un concealment, express the limits 
of disclosure. As with some road signs that tell us what we can not do, these 
signs tell us that truth is: 
a) non~foundational. Truth involves a mystery; it can not stem from or refer to 
a fixed source or determinate ground or essence; there are no ultimate expla-
nations. 
b) non-reductive. Truth is pluralistic and inclusive. No one setting can stand as 
the measure for other settings. 
c) non-un~form. Truth is multi-dimensional. No setting is fixed in one form 
within itself (e.g., one method in science), or sealed off from other settings. 
There is interpenetration and overlap among the settings (e.g., certain values 
indigenous to science). 
d) non-imperial. Truth is a letting-be (cf. Seinlassen). No setting can crowd out 
or absorb or dominate or banish other settings that are appropriate in their 
fashion. 
Inhabitive signs refer to disclosing regions of the world, and they permit 
affirmative statements. Aletheic signs indicate the limits of these statements (I 
include the element of alterity), an openness to mystery and change, and a 
pluralistic openness to the different regions and settings. In this way another kind 
of truth is expressed, which can therefore permit certain statements and even 
negative judgments (e.g., a foundationalist or reductive claim can be said to be 
not true in this sense). For example, with a material setting, where physical and 
empirical descriptions are said to be true, the inhabitive signs can all be followed. 
But if the aletheic signs are "disobeyed," in other words if a material setting 
becomes materialism, the inhabitive signs cannot be followed; such a reduction 
cannot make sense out of significant phenomena (e.g., brain-state language cannot 
work in conveying the meaning of the ideas on this page). Accordingly, both from 
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an aletheic and inhabitive standpoint, we can say that materialistic statements are 
not true. 
With respect to any statement, we can ask "Is it true?" in terms of the 
following questions: Is it appropriate, reliable, workable? Is there agreement, 
sense, existential meaning? Is it foundational, reductive, uniform, imperial? We 
can then work at various answers regarding its truth or untruth. 15 Here we can 
say more than simply "something is disclosed"; we can say "it is true." I should 
add that since I take the signs of truth to be an indivisible complex, then "being 
true" is ultimately a complex matter. Even with the simplest empirical statement, 
its meaning can be traced throughout the entire complex. And the aletheic signs 
show us that "being true" not only refers to what can particularly be said of 
something, but also includes the limits of what can be said, and the need for and 
the relation to other kinds of saying. Truth, then, can never ultimately involve one 
statement, but a constellation of many statements gathering positive, negative 
and relational elements. 16 
The various settings that disclose the world in different ways can thus be called 
true in some sense; they are not arbitrary, or fictions, or mere conventions. We 
can speak of the "authority" in some of the things we say, and speak against 
something like radical skepticism, relativism, phenomenalism, anarchism, or 
nihilism (all of which stem from the subjectistic atmosphere of Western metaphys-
ics). But the aletheic (and alteric) element in truth shows that this is not a return 
to correctness, foundationalism, or essentialism. Truth is not fixed, nor is it the 
absence of conflict. But truth can still work and happen. We must simply sort out 
the ways in which this is so. 
If the word truth were not seen in terms of its authoritative atmosphere, then it 
would make sense to segregate it from unconcealment-in other words, if truth 
were simply a synonym for unconcealment, this would cause confusion. But if 
there are good reasons for using the word truth in connection with unconceal-
ment, then it should be thought in terms of its authority. If there is any justification 
for linking truth with unconcealment, especially in terms of the historical relation-
ship between aletheia and truth-as-correctness, then the proposal to think uncon-
cealment in relation to an authoritative element in the word truth can receive 
some reinforcement. But beyond historical considerations, from a phenomenolog-
ical standpoint we continue to use, and need, the word truth. Often, when asked 
"Is that true?" in areas that are not a matter of correspondence, we reply "Yes." 
Do we ever have a right to say that? By way of the proposed signs, we can say 
that we do (i.e., it is appropriate, reliable, etc.). Even in a conversation about a 
most radical rejection of truth claims (e.g., a deconstructive critique), we might 
find ourselves saying "Yes, that's true." Is that a slip of the tongue, afaux pas, a 
vestigial lapse, a mere semantic convention that we either do not notice, or, out 
"Emphasizing the word "true" rather than "truth" is perhaps the better focus, since that would 
reflect the ways in which the adjective works in our sentences, and would avoid the impression of 
reification that can accompany a focus on nouns. 
16For example, a scientific claim involves the inhabitive signs and also the aletheic signs (e.g., the 
limits of what can be said, the fact that a scientific setting is not itself a scientific claim, that science 
cannot justify itself, that science is not fixed and certain), and a relation to other settings, e.g., 
aesthetic and moral elements in science (an "elegant" proof, honest work). 
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of generosity or indifference, simply "let pass"? Or is such a response ever 
appropriate? 
If the word truth is understood in an open way, with sensitivity to the problems 
of reification and closure, then in the light of the proposed signs the word can be 
used and have meaning. It need not be a "dirty word" or a taboo. We need 
neither abandon it nor replace it with obscure, unworkable neologisms (both of 
which would presume that the word is fixed). I do not think that my proposal is 
an arbitrary linguistic exchange of a traditional meaning for a brand new meaning 
(witness the non-theoretical meanings cited earlier). Nor do I think it involves a 
stubborn retention of, or "nostalgia" for, an old word. There is nothing wrong 
with an old word like truth, as long as it is understood and used properly. 
Moreover, there are times when we are better off with it than without it (or with 
some esoteric replacement). We need an open sense of truth that also carries 
some authority. There are times when something calls for, and receives, our 
commitmentY Although in an ultimate sense nothing "holds," sometimes we 
"take hold." The word truth works at these times. It may be that truth in the 
expanded sense I want to give it is misleading and might be dispensed with or 
replaced. But I do not think so. The word can and does function in the ways I 
have suggested. Retaining the word in the light of the signs permits its positive 
function in our discourse. It speaks when something calls for, and can receive, an 
affirmation.1R 
IV 
At this point I will suggest some ways in which this sense of truth can work in 
particular settings. I have already mentioned how the aletheic aspect of truth can 
function with respect to the problem of circularity. The underivability of primary 
assumptions was often expressed in the tradition by way of the term "self-
evident," meaning immediately certain, beyond question, a fundamental starting-
point or reference-point. But if an assumption does not "follow" from anything, 
then self-evidency can imply an abyss. There are a number of ways in which 
traditional philosophy can be seen responding to such an issue: The assumptions 
can be traced further to a divine mind (hence the maintenance of a God concept 
in philosophy and even in science up until the nineteenth century); the problem 
of a possible abyss can be ignored (e.g., positivism); the truth of the assumptions 
can be challenged or denied (e.g., skepticism, nihilism). But these options all 
maintain in one way or another the traditional standards of truth. Aletheic truth 
can work here, in that the implications of mystery, process, and uncertainty are 
affirmed in this sense of truth. A primary assumption is simply disclosed in the 
midst of concealment. Aletheic truth amounts to a positive transformation of 
"Cf. Heidegger's use of the term Bindung in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, tr. Michael 
Heim (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1984), p. 192, and Entschlossenheit in Being and Time. 
"Certain references in Heidegger's early writings can reflect the aims of my analysis here. For 
example, the relationship between assertion and disclosedness in section 44 of Being and Time, and 
the following passage from The Basic Problems of Phenomenology: " ... assertion, as communicative-
determinative exhibition, is a mode in which Dasein appropriates for itself the uncovered being as 
uncovered. This appropriation of a being in a true assertion about it is not ... a merely subjectivistic 
apprehending and investing of things with determinations which we cull from the subject and assign 
to the things .... Assertion is exhibitive letting-be-seen of beings" (section 18, p. 219). 
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what would be a flaw by traditional standards. But beyond the fact that a basic 
assumption is ultimately "groundless," we must add in the inhabitive signs to 
show that the assumption is not arbitrary. 
This opens up the possibility of pluralism, of affirming the truth of other settings 
that are likewise "groundless," but then no less suspect, no less "self-evident" 
(in an aletheic manner). Here we find a way around some familiar critiques of 
moral, aesthetic, and religious claims, e.g., that these claims cannot satisfy the 
conditions oftruth (correspondence with empirical facts or conceptual principles). 
An aletheic element opens up truth for these settings too, since the supposedly 
more "exact" settings are no more "secure" at their deepest levels. From an 
aletheic standpoint, exclusionary assertions can be judged to be wrong. But 
again, if we add the inhabitive elements, then moral claims, for example, can also 
be something more than simply "disclosed." They can in their way exhibit a 
comparable sense of inhabitive truth, which has a kind of authority and claim, 
which is not simply arbitrary or a matter of sUbjective preference or human 
projection. Phenomenologically speaking, when we practice science or hold moral 
values or respond to beauty or engage in philosophical inquiry, such activities 
are not taken to be simply a subjective projection upon a neutral or unknowable 
world. The direction is not taken to be coming solely from "us," but also from 
the environment in which we are engaged. A certain "claim" upon us is the 
catalyst for the language of truth. 
I want to say, for example, that there is truth in the sphere of ethics, that moral 
settings permit judgments. A moral setting can follow the signs of truth, both 
inhabitive and aletheic. The elusive "groundlessness" of moral claims, which has 
usually been considered a problem, now has aletheic truth. In fact, this also helps 
us overcome assumptions about "grounding" ethics in "subjective preferences" 
and opens up morality to its environment, its inhabitive truth. The "transcen-
dence" implied in inhabitive truth helps make sense out of what can and does 
show itself in moral situations. Are my objections to torture simply a matter of 
subjective preference? If my objections are shared, is the agreement here simply 
a matter of collusion or a collection of individual preferences? Disagreement or 
the lack of settlement that can accompany moral issues is often cited as a reason 
for turning to inner attitudes: If one and the same act can be considered moral by 
one person and immoral by another person, how can the moral "property" inhere 
in the act or in the world? It must, then, stem from a subjective state. 
But the assumption here is that limits and disagreement are a threat to truth. 
But that is so only by traditional standards of strict objectivity and certainty. 
Moreover, such an assumption has never been in line with the actual course of 
human thinking anyway, in any form. Scientific inquiry, both diachronically and 
synchronically, is marked by limits, disagreement, controversies, and dissettle-
ment at various levels. One might distinguish between science and morality in 
terms of the degree of agreement, but one cannot divorce truth from morality on 
the grounds of disagreement. Disagreement and various other limits and tensions 
are not a threat to truth; they are a part of truth and its unfolding. 
The idea of truth in morality fits in with Heidegger's objections to the term 
"value," which he renounced not because moral settings have no meaning, but 
because designating them as values ruins their authentic meaning by making them 
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simply a human estimation. 19 They must be more than that. Take the following 
moral claim: "The Nazis should not have exterminated millions of people." Is 
this claim true? By some interpretations, it is neither true nor false, since it does 
not fit into the scheme of certain truth conditions (e.g., empirical or conceptual). 
But should not we want to say it is true in some sense? To say it is simply a matter 
of preference(s) is both problematic (what about the Nazi preferences?), and from 
a phenomenological standpoint counter-intuitive (I take it as a response, not just 
the projection of a "feeling"), and in a way grotesque. 
Well, how can we say it is true? Simply that it is disclosed? That this is just the 
way we happen to think? Can this really work? After all, the converse can be 
disclosed and thought too. Even though I take the claim to have a kind of "self-
evidency," sorting out the ways in which the claim and its moral setting fit the 
inhabitive signs of truth can give us a more decisive answer to the question. 
Moreover, the aletheic signs help us even further. In the background of the Nazi 
atrocities was a totalistic, reductionistic, exclusionary picture of certain human 
groups (primarily Jews, but other groups as well), a picture which essentially 
"fixed" these human beings in a certain construct, and utterly denied them. 
Aletheic elements of truth can speak to the irreducible mystery of the human 
person, which enables us to make negative judgments of the Nazi viewpoint, i.e., 
they were wrong, and our objections can be called true in this sense.20 
This does not mean that a moral claim can be "justified" by a purely objective, 
rational or fixed standard. Nor does it eliminate limits, disagreement, or an alteric 
tension from the moral sphere. In an existential sense, a moral stance is never 
free from the tension of certain counter-forces in ourselves and in the world. The 
moral life is pervaded by a dynamic alterity that makes it a continual "achieving." 
This also applies to the fact that there are moral dilemmas and conflicts between 
differing moral agents or groups. This does not mean, however, that there is no 
way that we can use the word truth in the sphere of ethics. The inhabitive signs 
help in this regard. And even though morality is uncertain and a constant field of 
tension, at a certain point there is a decision, a commitment. In my view, the 
phenomenon of commitment does not make much sense if morality is simply a 
matter of preferences or subjective states. Do we commit to, or make sacrifices 
for, an "opinion"? 
The word truth is essential for the phenomenology of commitment. My analysis 
here has nothing to do with a moral "theory," but with the way in which we take 
up a moral principle in lived engagement, and what this means regarding the 
appropriate uses of the word truth. Not only is moral truth not a matter of 
19Kockelmans, On the Truth of Being, p. 258; see also p. 261. 
"'The negativity of human existence (cf. the Nothing, the transcendence of Dasein, potentiality, 
etc.) can serve to defend many of our moral, social and political principles. Many attitudes and abuses 
which we want to reject are driven by a fixed and closed picture of what a human being or group "is." 
For example, objections to racism, sexism, slavery and tyranny need not require traditional principles 
or universal reference points or alternative models of what a human being "is." Objections can follow 
from seeing human existence as not fixed in or closed by any determination. The "error" of racism 
and sexism involves the closure of a person in terms of physical or biological properties or roles; in 
slavery there is the reduction of a person to a function; in tyranny there is the constraint and closure 
of human thinking and possibilities. Consequently, the truth of certain "democratic freedoms" can 
be defended in terms of the implicit negativity of unconcealment. For more on this in another vein, 
see my "Nietzsche, Nihilism and Meaning," The Personalist Forum 3 (1987), 91-111. 
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uniformity, certainty, or objectivity (moral options are chosen, and one does not 
"choose" an objective truth); it also is not a matter of something like relativism. 
From a phenomenological standpoint, relativism (in the sense that different moral 
claims are equally valid and thus defensible in some sense) is an impossible term 
when it comes to certain moments of commitment. For example, the "authority" 
of our principles and objections to the Nazis was, in the end, not a matter of 
"justification." Rather, it was shown in a collective deed, in our decision and 
commitment to fight the Nazis. One does not fight something and at the same 
time affirm its truth. Even though the Nazis had "their own" values, and even if 
they had won, that would not change anything. There is such a thing as evil, and 
there is always tragedy. 
Although I have laid out certain "positive" features that can show how truth 
can work (the inhabitive signs), the aletheic and alteric elements also show how 
truth is never separated from limits, tension, failure, even tragedy. Nevertheless, 
the phenomenon of commitment reveals how the word truth can still work in the 
midst of all this. In the final section of this essay, I want to work with the notion 
of commitment to round out my general analysis and also offer some remarks 
about Heidegger and Derrida. 
v 
The traditional conception of truth, which follows from metaphysical concep-
tions of ground, foundation, or fixed structure, and which is governed by the 
desire for certainty, should be rejected. But this does not mean that a different 
sense of truth cannot be defended, one that operates in and reflects a non-
foundational atmosphere, and that can exhibit some aspects of the affirmative 
tone of the word truth. I have attempted a sketch of such a sense of truth which 
neither reverts to foundationalism, nor rests in mystery or withdrawal or uncon-
cealment alone, nor disperses into an undecidable play of signs. 21 
21There have been a number of contemporary attempts likewise to think of truth in ways that are 
neither foundationalist nor purely mysterious nor wide open, the most notable example being the 
work of Gadamer. For an insightful analysis, see Bernstein, Beyond Objectivity and Relativism; for 
the differences between Gadamer and Heidegger, see Theodore Kisiel, "The Happening of Tradition: 
The Hermeneutics of Gadamer and Heidegger," and David Ingram, "Hermeneutics and Truth," both 
in Hermeneutics and Praxis, ed. Robert Hollinger (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1985). 
For a rich collection on the confrontation between Gadamer and Derrida, see Dialogue and Decon-
struction, edd. Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989). Although 1 
see much to support in Gadamer, 1 see my approach as being more open than his and other comparable 
projects, which 1 take to be guided more by a traditional hope that there is at least something universal 
in the human condition that can bring us together, no matter how finite, historical, or dynamic that 
condition may be. Nothing in my analysis is meant to suggest such a thing; 1 am too much influenced 
by Nietzsche for something like that. I think Gadamer is bound by traditional aspirations, even if he 
sees the limits in the tradition (I concur with Caputo's critique in Radical Hermeneutics, pp. 108-15). 
My signs and settings are not meant to suggest a possible "convergence" or "fusion of horizons" or 
any kind of common, universal reference that can sort everything out into some kind of overarching 
order. I simply propose that the word truth can make sense in some fashion and to some extent. In 
various ways, there are instances of "ordering," but there is nothing common or universal or 
organized about this. In my view, "chaos" is not waiting to be finally resolved, and tragedy shows a 
truth that can never be erased. 
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In regard to Heidegger and Derrida,22 the tack of my defense of truth is as 
follows: Certain elements in Denken and deconstruction seem to have drifted 
from the "situatedness" of the lived world, that which generated the hermeneu-
tics of existential-phenomenology in the first place. Traditional philosophy was 
called away from its abstract detachment from pre-theoretical engagement back 
to the lived world, and that reorientation dismantled the pretense of strict 
objectivity, certainty and fixed foundations. But the lived world also shows 
moments of commitment, and such moments are a focus for my appropriation of 
the word truth. In a way, I am calling for a retrieval of some of Kierkegaard's 
insights regarding moments of choice, decision and commitment that we face in 
life. Have Heidegger and Derrida drifted from something that Kierkegaard right-
fully refused to ignore? When faced with a Heideggerian "meditation" on Being, 
lethe, withdrawal, etc., or with a deconstructive analysis of "texts," might it be 
that the lived world has been eclipsed again? Has the old detachment returned in 
some way here? Perhaps. But part of my approach to truth can be understood in 
terms of the complementary relationship between Heidegger's and Derrida's 
thinking. Each can serve as an effective counter-weight to the other, and as such 
feed into my intentions. 
Derrida's critique of Heidegger is useful for at least two reasons. First, his 
analysis of supposed "priorities" in Heidegger that wind up deconstructing 
themselves is extremely important. For example, the priority of Being is said to 
be inseparable from, and dependent on, beings in its meaning; it could be that 
beings come first. 23 My attempt to think the word truth as an inseparable 
interrelation of negative and positive elements, of aletheia and truth, without 
proposing truth as some kind of ontological priority, is at least trying to work 
from such a notion of "interplay." Secondly, Derrida's deconstructive reading of 
Heidegger's texts is a needed warning about the dangers of slipping into closure 
in any form, and about the mistakes that metaphors like "rest," "withdrawal" 
and "origin" can perpetuate. Derrida wants to keep thought open and ever-
dynamic, and Heidegger's tone and usage often suggest a departure from the 
alteric strife that is shown in thought and life. Here too, my analysis is trying to 
pay heed to the openness, tension and dynamism that occupy Derrida's thinking. 
But when Derrida gives the impression of overdoing openness and seems to 
speak against my sense of settlement, things have gone too far. If Derrida's 
approach to truth, for example, is limited to a retrieval of a Nietzschean-like 
denial of truth in favor of a Dionysian play of "fictions, "24 if this is meant to be 
more than simply a polemical counter-weight to traditional conceptions of truth, 
my pause at this is a catalyst for my reappropriation of truth. 25 I see this 
"In my remarks about Heidegger and Derrida, I am not suggesting that their thinking cannot or 
does not reflect some of the things I am advocating. In fact, it has been my reading of Heidegger and 
Derrida that has led me in the direction I am going, a direction that I do not take to be incompatible 
with either writer. My intention here is to contrast my position with certain tendencies in Heidegger 
and Derrida, or with certain interpretations of their writings. 
"See Briankle G. Chang, "The Eclipse of Being: Heidegger and Derrida," International Philosoph-
ical Quarterly 25 (1985), 133-37. 
"See Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles, tr. Barbara Harlow (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978). 
"In addition, an interpretation of Nietzsche as a proponent of fictions in place of truth is misleading 
and in some ways dead wrong. For Nietzsche, the radical denial of truth is no less problematic than 
the traditional affirmation of truth; in fact, radical denial is the most extreme expression of the 
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reappropriation as a reflection of a Heideggerian counter-weight to deconstruc-
tion, captured in the images of "dwelling" and "home." Heidegger's metaphors 
and poetic usages attempt to say something positive without falling into the trap 
of conceptual structures or fixtures. The image of language as the "house of 
Being" does suggest something that "stands," but no house is permanent or 
ever-present, and a home is not a fort. One need not be a "nomad" to be free of 
metaphysical fixtures. (Could language be the "mobile home" of Being?) Is the 
issue for deconstructionists that words themselves are the problem? That their 
mere presence or placement is a kind of crime of closure that requires a continuing 
counter-attack? But if the words of deconstruction can show us the limits and 
dangers of words, if language can speak to its own limits, then language need not 
always be a trap, and an over-prosecution of words may in some way be driven 
by the old assumption that words are fixed meanings. A deconstructive critique 
which insists on the continuing interplay of meanings is an extremely important 
contribution in the war against reductionism and closure, and in the promotion of 
openness (in thought and life). But a liberated attitude need not be nomadic; the 
dec entering of meaning should not mean that we cannot dwell with a word. And 
dwelling with a word need not mean that limits, uncertainties, and tensions are 
ignored or overlooked or forgotten. Dwelling need not be a fixation. Heidegger 
used poetic metaphors to accommodate the needed openness. It is evident that 
my analysis has not always followed that path, especially in my retention of the 
word truth. But I suppose my point is that any word, even an old philosophical 
word, can be open too, and appropriated positively, as long as it is analyzed and 
understood and used properly. 
I have attempted to think unconcealment and truth together and in between 
each other. I want to focus on unconcealment without an emphasis on lethe, 
which would suggest some" " that is somehow significant in itself. Unconceal-
ment speaks the process-character of thought, which can express both a non-
foundational emergence (Heidegger) and the negative tensions of thought (Der-
rida). But unconcealment and interplay are not enough. Both need to be con-
nected in some way with the authoritative sense of the word truth (with the 
appropriate modifications). I say this not out of some conservative stubbornness, 
but because I think that otherwise the projects of Heidegger and Derrida might 
not work in the way that they should. If obscure neologisms and a kind of distance 
from important meanings in the lived world, in culture, and in the philosophical 
tradition are perpetuated, then Heidegger and Derrida may not make any differ-
ence, outside of their special group of followers. 
I have couched the issue of truth in terms of the phenomenon of commitment. 
Critical renunciations of closure on behalf of mystery and interplay do pertain 
well to a treatment of philosophical theories and metaphysical constructions. But 
traditional view! (See my "Nietzsche, Nihilism and Meaning.") Moreover, Nietzsche never proposed 
the Dionysian as either separable from, or "superior" to, the Apollonian. Form and formlessness are 
inseparable and co-equal, both in tragedy and in thought generally. Finally, Nietzsche continued to 
use the word truth (the truth of becoming, "my truth"), albeit in a special way. Although this is not 
always evident in his writings, he did realize that the elimination of the traditional model of a "true 
world" also makes the idea of an "apparent world" meaningless, and hence the idea of "fiction" 
would likewise be meaningless (see The Twilight of the Idols, "How the 'True World' Finally Becomes 
a Fable," 6). 
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when it comes to commitment in lived engagement, such renunciations must be 
modified, which is where I think the word truth can be appropriate. 26 Both a 
Heideggerian Denken and a deconstructive critique should, in their projects, 
acknowledge and reflect the moments of commitment in life and thought, mo-
ments which, though not grounded in fixed foundations, are nevertheless not an 
utter mystery or mere nomadic interplay. For Kierkegaard, commitment never 
involved the overcoming of uncertainty and limits, but rather simply taking a 
stand, and dwelling in its uncertainty and limits as well. In regard to Kierkegaard's 
"either-or" as a critique of Hegel's existentially meaningless "both-and" dialec-
tic, I wonder ifhe would bejust as incensed with what might be called deconstruc-
tion's "neither-nor" and Heidegger's "no-comment." In life there are moments 
demanding an either-or, where we cannot have both (or have neither, or "take it 
back," or "hide"). We make choices in moral situations, political situations, 
intellectual situations (e.g., when to accept science and when not). A choice must 
affirm something, deny something, and in various ways the word truth can and 
should work here. Even in deconstruction, there are good reasons for preferring 
and choosing its methods. 27 
Truth-as-unconcealment-and-unconcealment-as-truth reflects a pluralistic, dy-
namic "family" of settings, variously appropriate at different times, in different 
situations, to different degrees. There are times when verification is to be chosen 
over intuition and vice versa, facts over mystery and vice versa, reason over 
emotion and vice versa, clarity over ambiguity and vice versa, order over freedom 
and vice versa, the group over the individual and vice versa. But there are also 
times when different settings overlap and penetrate each other. Moments of truth 
are shown in judgments about appropriateness and inappropriateness in these 
times. The art of thinking is to sort this out, but also to acknowledge and reflect 
the limits involved, the alteric tension, the radical changes that occur, the absence 
of complete consensus, and the sense of mystery within it all. But along this way, 
signs of truth guide us to places that are best called sojourns, momentary stays 
along the way. 
'6At times deconstruction seems like a case of academic indulgence. Is it nothing more than a 
method of reading texts, or rather, nothing more than a reflection of academic practice? Professional 
readers interpreting philosophy solely in terms of what they do alone? Is what has been called 
"interminable analysis" (Chang, "The Eclipse of Being," p. 126), and the priority of writing, simply 
another way of saying "interminable publishing"') Is "undecidability" simply open season for 
interpreters? Is there a kind of praxis-centrism here? Is the "seduction" of deconstruction (ibid., 
p. 124) something like seduction in Kierkegaard's aesthetic stage, namely the absence of commitment? 
Would not lived commitments express moments in which deconstructive "undecidability" decon-
structs itself" Would not this be consistent with deconstruction? If one were to reply that these 
moments, though evident, are not the province of a deconstructive reading of texts, then it would 
seem that here we have a curious return to the old detachment of philosophy from life. 
"In fact, the inhabitive signs for truth apply well to deconstruction. It is appropriate, it fits 
phenomena (the critique is not forced on the text but is shown in the text). It is reliable, it continues 
to work throughout particular cases. There is agreement among proponents. It makes sense out of the 
elusiveness of sense. It obeys all the aletheic signs, more so than any other orientation. Accordingly, 
there is truth in deconstruction. 
